book

Abstract

A glance at the history of Western philosophy indicate that the language of this philosophy almost relies on certain opposing poles; rationalism versus empiricism; skepticism versus certainty; relativism versus absolutism and subjectivity versus objectivity; man versus God etc. But the opposing poles that are discussed in this book is the confrontation between the paradigms of continental philosophy and analytic philosophy which turn out to be two contemporary, influential and dominant trends in philosophy and philosophizing in the West. Regardless of the similarities in the views of the philosophers of these two paradigms, we can't deny that they have their own priorities, interests, philosophical concerns and specific features, that by reviewing these features we will come to know that why we face a philosophical confrontation between the two trends and their advocates. In this book, among all these features, we specifically reduce the issue to the status of method in each paradigm so that, we assume the '' empathy in method'' as against the '' anti-empathy in method'', as one the main different points among these two trends. The distinction and difference can be stretched to the field of philosophy of science as well, for basically the issue of method, methodology and scientific structures have already been discussed in philosophy of science. So we will face two kinds of paradigms:  '' the philosophy of analytic science '' or '' the philosophy of methodical science '' and in the opposite side '' the philosophy of continental science '' or '' the philosophy of contextual science ''. In a part of this article we shed light on the philosophy of methodical science by discussing the origins of this paradigm with reference to the views of Hampel, Lakatos, Betti, and Hirsch following which we will criticize this paradigm by focusing on certain topics of modern physics versus Newtonian physics, and refer to Heidegger's critical assessment of some main concepts of analytic paradigm, scientific antirealism arguments and Heidegger's new approach to phenomenology and hermeneutics. In order to explore the ideas of continental paradigm, we discuss the hermeneutics and the contextual philosophy of science with reference to Gadamer's and Feyerabendd's views, and refer to the critical approach of analytic philosophers towards these theories, and we also refer to the outset of historical dispute of explanation-understanding concerning the place of method. The body and the general structure of all topics in different chapters of this survey is classified and based on paradigmatic model of Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science. Considering this classification and formulation, it can be said that being in a paradigm will bring in its wake certain weak points that may hamper any dialogue between rival paradigms, so if our main objective in this thesis is to provide a ground for an inter-paradigmatic dialogue between traditions of continental and analytic philosophy, then we have to first overcome the obstacles. According to Kuhn's model the philosophers of these two fields reside in different paradigms, so there's no logical reason to show that any of them is prior to another. Because they give different priorities to different factors (factor of method), and the point is that finding an area in which the rival paradigms come closer to each other is not logically possible. So based on this paradigmatic model, in the last chapter of this thesis, we look for a balance position which its least benefit is to reduce the gap between these two paradigms with reference to Ricoeur's concept of paradigm of continental philosophy and Wittgenstein's version of analytic philosophy; for each philosopher looks at the rival one as a possibility by his own specific language and by balancing his own status of method in his own list of paradigmatic priorities seeks to widen the scope of thoughts in order to get closer to the balanced area. Undoubtedly developing a coordinate of the balanced area require certain figures who can replace confrontation with compromise, and these two philosophers theoretically and practically enjoy such characteristics. Here I am of the view that we can explain a coordinate which is capable of reconciling certain specific and universal concepts of the two trends that I call it '' The Grammar of Ontological Concepts ''. In other words, it can be said that human awareness consists of constant and contextual patterns and we can put these two kinds of methodical and textual epistemology together to achieve the meaning. We are no suppose to evaluate their values or give priority to either of the rival trends; our purpose is to achieve an empathic understanding of the rival groups and prepare the ground for a dialogue based on an overlapping area.